CONFERENCE
From matchings to markets. A tale of Mathematics, Economics and Computer Science.
Des matchings aux marchés. Une histoire de mathématiques.
11 – 15 December 2023
Scientific Committee
Comité scientifique
Nick Arnosti (University of Minnesota)
Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University)
Alfred Galichon (Science Po & New York University)
Michael Jordan (University of California Berkeley & INRIA Paris)
Claire Mathieu (CNRS – Collège France)
Organizing Committee
Comité d’organisation
Nick Arnosti (University of Minnesota)
Julien Combe (CREST & École Polytechnique)
Claire Mathieu (CNRS – Paris)
Vianney Perchet (ENSAE & Criteo AI lab)
This conference aims at gathering researchers from the fields of mathematics, computer science and economics (broadly defined) sharing common interests in the study of matching problems and the design of their markets. The presentations can cover a wide variety of topics and methods: specific matching markets, general models, theory, empirical analysis. . . etc
Cette conférence a pour objectif de rassembler des chercheurs issus de domaines différents de mathématiques, d’informatique et d’économies (au sens large), partageant un intérêt comment dans l’étude des questions de ”matchings” dans les graphes ainsi que leurs potentielles applications dans la construction de marchés. Les présentations vont couvrir une grande variété de sujets et de méthodes : marchés de matching spécifique, modèle généraux, théorie de graphes aléatoires, analyse empirique d’algorithmes, etc…
SPEAKERS
Alireza Amanihamedani (London Business School) Spatial Matching under Resource Competition
Spyros Angelopoulos (Sorbonne Université) Search games with predictions
Ali Aouad (London Business School) Centralized versus Decentralized Pricing Controls for Dynamic Matching Platforms
Étienne Boursier (Inria Saclay – Ile-de-France) Multiplayer bandits, overview and perspectives
Rémi Castera (Université Grenoble Alpes) Statistical Discrimination in Stable Matching
Maria Cherifa (ENSAE Paris) Online matching with budget refills
Julien Combe (École polytechnique) Market Design for Distributional Objectives
Hafedh El Ferchichi (Inria Saclay – Ile-de-France) Ranking in rounds, with application to matchmaking
Felipe Garrido-Lucero (ENSAE Paris) DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation
Julius Goedde (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) Satiation, unraveling and compressing prices. Designing peer-to-peer platforms with internal currencies
Julien Grand-Clément (HEC Paris) Regret Matching+: Instability and Fast Convergence in Games
Kenzo Imamura (University of Tokyo) Efficient and Strategy-proof Mechanism under General Constraints
Michael Jordan (University of California, Berkeley) Statistical Contract Theory
Süleyman Kerimov (Rice University) Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret
Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome) Learning Pricing Mechanisms for Two-sided Markets
Mike Liu (ENSAE Paris) Local Analysis of Matchings on Sparse Graphs
Claire Mathieu (CNRS – Paris) College admissions with strongly correlated preferences
Simon Mauras (Tel Aviv University) Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations
Pascal Moyal (Université de Lorraine) From Stochastic Matching models on graphs to Matching on random graphs
Eduardo Perez (SciencesPo) Non-market allocation mechanisms: Optimal design and investment incentives
William Phan (North Carolina State University) School Capital, Funding, and Student Choice
Tristan Pollner (Stanford University) Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet Inequalities
Gary Qiurui Ma (Harvard University) Platform Equilibrium: Analayzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places
Hugo Richard (Criteo AI Lab) Constant or logarithmic regret in asynchronous multiplayer bandits
Amin Saberi (Stanford University) Two-Stage Stochastic Matching and Pricing with Applications to Ride Hailing
Flore Sentenac (ENSAE Paris) Online Matching in Geometric Random Graphs
Serena Wang (University of California, Berkeley) Operationalizing Counterfactual Metrics: Incentives, Ranking, and Information Asymmetry
Geng Zhao (University of California, Berkeley) Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets
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